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Abstract 
 
Philosophy has been a public endeavor since its origins in ancient Greece, India, and China. However, recent 
years have seen the development of a new type of public philosophy conducted by both academics and non-
professionals. The new public philosophy manifests itself in a range of modalities, from the publication of 
magazines and books for the general public to a variety of initiatives that exploit the power and flexibility of 
social networks and new media. In this paper we examine the phenomenon of public philosophy in its several 
facets, and investigate whether and in what sense it is itself a mix of philosophical practice and teaching. We 
conclude with a number of suggestions to academic colleagues on why and how to foster further growth of 
public philosophy for the benefit of society at large and of the discipline itself. 
  
     
 
 
I. What is public philosophy? 
 
The concept of “public philosophy” is at once very old and extremely recent. One can 
reasonably argue that philosophy has always been “public,” at least until the onset of the 
specialized professional academy in the 20th century. Socrates certainly thought of himself 
as a public philosopher, and so did pretty much all his fellow travelers from the ancient 
Greeks to the Early Moderns (Hume in particular comes to mind, but also Rousseau, 
Nietzsche, and many others). 
 
But in the context of current discussions, “public philosophy” refers to a heterogeneous set 
of developments that have taken place over the past several years, broadly characterized by 
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a conscious attempt on the part of (some) professional (usually, but not only, academic) 
philosophers to engage the public at large. As we shall see below, this engagement includes 
(but is not limited to) the production of series of books using popular culture as a vehicle to 
introduce people to philosophical thinking, the use of a number of social networks (Twitter, 
Facebook, Google+ and the like) to increase awareness of philosophical ideas, the 
publication of an increasing number of magazines of philosophy aimed at the general 
public, the organization of “meetups” and similar physical venues for discussing philosophy 
in public, and of course blogging, where faculty and graduate students reach an increasingly 
wide and sometimes surprisingly sophisticated audience to discuss timeless philosophical 
issues as well as the latest in a particular sub-field’s scholarship. 
 
As with most issues in philosophy, these developments have bred controversy. Some 
academic philosophers may claim that public engagement activities distract from work more 
useful to the field. We argue that any such objections are misguided. Public philosophy is a 
valuable, indeed even vitally necessary, philosophical activity and should be pursued by 
professional philosophers for both practical and theoretical reasons. 
 
In what follows we briefly discuss the debate between philosophers over the utility of public 
philosophy and put that debate in the context of broader concerns over the academy’s 
engagement with the public (section II). We survey a broad (though non-exhaustive) array 
of ways of doing public philosophy (section III), and then explore the question of whether 
these are ways of doing philosophy, ways of teaching the subject, or something else entirely 
(section IV). We do so from the particular standpoint of philosophers who have actually 
engaged directly in all of these manifestations of public philosophy. We conclude (section 
V) that public philosophy is at least as worthwhile a pursuit as other forms of philosophy 
and make some recommendations about how to further nurture its growth. 
 
II. Does philosophy need public engagement? 
 
In a word: yes. The need for public philosophy is absolute and perhaps even dire, as we will 
argue below. Nevertheless, our view has been disputed by practitioners within philosophy, 
at least in part because of threats from outside the field. From the outside: non-philosophers 
disparage the study of philosophy generally, and so public philosophy with it. From the 
inside: a number of (fortunately, increasingly older) colleagues disparage engagement with 
the public as a waste of time, or an activity of “inferior” intellectual value — as opposed to 
writing yet another academic paper that will likely be read by a dozen people worldwide 
and cited maybe once or twice during its shelf life. 
 
Essays Philos (2014)15:1                                                                                        Pigliucci & Finkelman | 88 
 
 
 
It is indubitable that philosophy these days suffers from a significant public relations 
problem. Politicians and university administrators routinely refer to philosophy as a 
“ridiculous” or, at best, useless, pursuit.1 Surprisingly (or perhaps not), some of the most 
vicious attacks on philosophy come from a closely allied discipline: science. It has been a 
matter of routine in recent years for prominent scientists, especially physicists, to somewhat 
unilaterally declare philosophy either useless or “dead.” To mention just two examples, 
Nobel physicist Steven Weinberg dedicated an entire chapter of his book, Dreams of a Final 
Theory to a rant against philosophy2 in which he, ironically, used philosophical arguments 
to make his point. More recently, Stephen Hawking opened his recent book for the general 
public, The Grand Design, with an excoriating dismissal of philosophy, only to proceed — 
apparently blissfully unaware — to write a whole book about what is best characterized as 
philosophy of cosmology.3 
 
There may be several explanations of this state of affairs. Broadly speaking, one may blame 
pervasive anti-intellectualism (particularly in American society), although one would expect 
that scientists should not suffer from this particular ill.4 Another, more specific, cause may 
be the increasing commodification of academic teaching and scholarship.5 In considering 
the utility of philosophical research, philosopher of science Philip Kitcher notes that 
philosophy does not seem to produce the same tangible effects attributed to (say) scientific 
research. Philosophers are embroiled in unresolved debates between internalist and 
externalist theories of epistemology, or over the grounds of metaphysical emergence; 
scientific research does not seem to be slowed by the philosophers’ lack of resolution, nor 
does it seem likely that the scientists’ work will be improved by settlement of the 
philosophical debates.6 The effects on professional philosophy are clear: if a field is so 
demonstrably useless (and doesn’t bring in large research grants), then research institutions 
might as well stop encouraging its pursuit. Indeed, a number of universities have already 
closed their philosophy departments and others threaten to follow suit.7 
 
Whether or not a pursuit is useful is, in part, an empirical question (after one has 
conceptually clarified what measure of utility one is interested in and why), and the data 
confirms that the study of philosophy is in fact useful. In particular, it is useful precisely by 
the commoditized metrics used to judge the success of academic programs: for example, 
statistically it is clear that philosophy majors can expect a higher-than-average entry-level 
income after graduation.8 Anecdotally, no less a scientific authority than Albert Einstein 
thought that studying philosophy was crucial for success in science and encouraged his 
colleagues to pursue it. 9  Philosophy departments routinely share these facts through 
brochures and departmental websites in an effort to attract more students (and thereby stave 
off threats of department closure).10 
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Nevertheless, many non-philosophers continue to believe that philosophy is a priori a waste 
of time and resources. Their insistence may be indirectly encouraged by sources within 
philosophy itself. We can personally attest to the disdain that some of our colleagues have 
for any sort of public outreach: they argue that such efforts draw resources away from 
research that may advance the field. Kitcher notes that, since disciplinary progress often 
entails fragmentation and specialization, the sorts of questions that many philosophers 
qualify as “centrally” important are esoteric and uninteresting to the broader public; by 
contrast, philosophical questions of direct public interest are considered “peripheral” to 
professional philosophy. 11  Consequently, philosophy has tended towards insularity, and 
many of its practitioners see efforts to make it more accessible as antithetical to its progress. 
 
Whether or not philosophy is demonstrably useful, there are professional philosophers who 
believe that it ought only to be useful for professional philosophers, or (less harshly) that 
professional philosophers ought only to engage the insular concerns of other professional 
philosophers. Public philosophy seems beside these points, if not wholly opposed to them. 
This is an evaluative question that is much more difficult to resolve than the empirical 
question of usefulness, and so the public relations problem persists. 
 
It is somewhat ironic that perhaps the best lesson for how to get philosophy out of its 
current rut comes from science itself. It was not long ago that public advocacy of 
science was perceived by most practicing scientists — especially in the US — as at best 
an entirely secondary activity, pursued by colleagues who were just not good enough to 
do real science.12 Things changed palpably in the early 1990s, when the Republican 
“revolutionaries” in Congress, headed by then Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, 
began making rumors to the effect that they were going to cut science funding, 
especially in “sensitive” areas, such as evolutionary biology and cosmology (because 
notions like evolution and the Big Bang went contrary to the religious fundamentalism 
of many of their constituents). Suddenly, pretty much every American professional 
science society, including the National Academy of Sciences, found it crucial to engage 
in public outreach efforts. It is now easy to find prominent scientists who write for the 
public without suffering any ill effect to their academic careers. Public science festivals 
and other outreach events (including the increasingly popular “Darwin Day” annual 
occurrence) are the order of the day. 
 
That is precisely the sort of thing that needs to happen in philosophy — and which to some 
extent is in fact happening as a result of public philosophy. The difficulties for our field, 
however, are larger than those encountered by scientists: after all, the problem for scientists 
was almost exclusively internally generated, an issue of convincing practitioners of various 
Essays Philos (2014)15:1                                                                                        Pigliucci & Finkelman | 90 
 
 
 
scientific disciplines to engage and recognize the value of public outreach. While much 
specialized academic philosophy is indeed “useless” (to the broader public), this is true of 
any specialized academic field, including the sciences. It would be just as difficult for a 
philosopher to explain why one more commentary on Kant is good for society as it would 
be for a biologist to explain why one more study on the sexual habits of an obscure species 
of moth would be valuable to life on main street. But that is not what needs to be done, and 
again the model of science can be usefully adopted by other disciplines. A great part of the 
value of science for the general public lies in the curiosity it nurtures about the natural 
world, in its respect for fact-based theorizing, and in the occasional applications with 
societal impact that arise from basic scientific research. Philosophers have failed to remind 
people of analogous benefits stemming from their own discipline: respect for critical 
thinking, dialogue and diversity of opinion, sharpening of one’s own reasoning tools, and a 
number of contributions to society ranging from the invention of logic to the articulation of 
the principles of democracy.13 
 
But of course science per se already enjoyed an enormous social cachet. Not so philosophy, 
where the battle — as we have argued — needs to be fought on both the internal front 
(professional philosophers who discourage talking to the public) and the external one (the 
general perception in society of philosophy as the epitome of useless pursuits). 
Nevertheless, success in battles on the external front depends at least in part on winning on 
the internal one, and so that will be our focus here. The first step is to recognize that 
philosophy has a public image problem and it behooves the profession to look seriously in 
how to address it. We now turn to some of the possibilities offered by public philosophy as 
it has established itself over the past several years. These forms of outreach are ultimately as 
valuable to the field as less-controversially beneficial professional activities, as we will 
show, and this in turn demonstrates why professional philosophers ought to value and 
engage in public outreach. 
 
III. The (many) ways of public philosophy 
 
There are a number of ways to practice public philosophy. We have had the opportunity to 
engage in most if not all of them, so that we can write from personal experience. What 
follows is a brief description of the various modalities, with their pros and cons, as a 
contribution to the taxonomy of public philosophy, as well as to discussions about the 
efficacy of its various forms. 
 
Perhaps the most traditional way of doing public outreach from within any academic 
discipline is through magazines and books written for the general public. However, until not 
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so long ago it was hard to imagine any philosophical equivalent of Scientific American or 
even Discover magazine, and pretty much the only thing a layperson interested in 
philosophy could find in bookstores was yet another “History of Western Philosophy.”14 
The situation has recently changed significantly in both respects. 
 
There is now a good number of philosophy magazines aimed at laypeople, including but not 
limited to: Philosophy Now (est. 1991), The Philosophers’ Magazine (est. 1997), Think 
magazine (est. 2002), Cogito (est. 2004), New Philosopher (est. 2013), and several others. 
The articles in these publications tend to be short, cover a wide range of topics, and are 
often (but not always) written by professional philosophers. The language is non-technical, 
and the quality of the entries varies from publication to publication and even within the 
same issue of a given magazine — just as in the case of the science equivalents of these 
outlets, such as Discover or Scientific American. 
 
In terms of books publishing, several houses have hit on the idea of exploiting elements of 
popular culture to introduce new audiences to philosophizing. These include Blackwell’s 
“And Philosophy” series, Open Court’s “Popular Culture and Philosophy” list, and the 
University of Kentucky Press’ “Philosophy of Pop Culture” entries. Typically, professional 
philosophers write the chapters in these books, and they range in levels of depth from 
collection to collection (and, like the magazines, even within a single offering). The editors 
of these series generally do a good job at picking topics that resonate with a broad audience, 
and yet lend themselves as a vehicle to introduce readers to serious philosophical issues. 
Our own entries in these anthologies alternately reflect the academic’s dual role as teacher 
and as researcher: essays such as “Sherlock’s Reasoning Toolbox”15 and “All for One and 
One for All: Mogo, the Collective, and Biological Unity” 16  are written to explain 
philosophical concepts whereas “The Limits of Scientism Sheldon Cooper Style”17  and 
“Man and Superman: What a Kryptonian Can Teach Us About Human Nature”18 present 
original philosophical arguments. 
 
A second broad category of public philosophy is the philosophy cafe and similar initiatives. 
These can take a variety of forms, from so-called Socrates Cafes to “Meetup” groups. The 
basic idea is to gather interested people in a public social setting (a coffee house, public 
library, restaurant, etc.) to discuss philosophical topics with the aid of a facilitator. The topic 
may be set in advance by the facilitator, or even decided on the spur of the moment by 
consulting the gathered participants. The quality of these interactions, again, varies as a 
function of both the abilities of the facilitator and the background, interests and personalities 
of the attendees. Our own experience with a Meetup group in New York City has been more 
than gratifying. The group was established in 2007, has met a total of 151 times as of this 
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writing, and counts a whopping 1,438 members. These numbers should go a long way 
towards undermining the belief that it is difficult to interest laypeople in philosophy. 
 
Next in our short tour of how to do public philosophy we move from concrete physical 
experiences to virtual ones, particularly blogs and social networks. The “blog” (a 
contraction of “web log“) is a phenomenon that emerged in the late 1990s and has since 
exploded all over the internet. As a further development, since about 2009 there has been a 
significant increase in the number of blogs hosting several authors. At a rough count in 
early 2011 there were about 156 million public blogs in the world. In philosophy, David 
Chalmers hosts a list of disciplinary blogs organized by general topic. According to 
BioMetrics, the top philosophy blog is hosted by Brian Leiter from the University of 
Chicago. One of us (Pigliucci) has been hosting the RationallySpeaking.org blog — devoted 
mostly to science and philosophy — since 2005. To date, the blog has published 1,151 
entries, has received a total of 32,649 comments, and has been visited 3,281,600 times. 
Blogging is a fascinating experience, which gives professional academics (not just in 
philosophy: science blogs are numerous and highly popular) a very different experience 
from that of the classroom. While the quality of comments posted by readers varies 
tremendously (especially if the blog host does not moderate incoming comments; host 
moderation is definitely encouraged), good blogs build quality readership over time, and 
some readers can seriously and knowledgeably challenge the blog writers even on 
somewhat technical issues. 
 
Finally, public philosophy may be done on social networks like Facebook, Google+, 
Twitter and a number of others. The kinds of interaction, as well as the best way to 
utilize these platforms, varies depending on some of the same factors briefly mentioned 
for blogging, but also because of the specific features of a given social networking 
platform. For instance, again writing from personal experience, Google+ and Facebook 
allow prolonged, somewhat in-depth dialogues with one’s “followers,” while Twitter is 
best used for rapid, shorter communications (such as pointing one’s followers to select 
internet resources) rather than for actual discussions. At last check Alain de Botton (an 
independent, non-academic scholar) was the top philosopher on Twitter with a 
whopping 397,121 followers; Daniel Dennett and Peter Singer ranked immediately after 
(respectively with 46,733 and 40,194 followers). 
 
Regardless of the type of social networking platform (and this goes also for blogs, to some 
extent), the key lies in engaging one’s audience frequently, which can, of course, be a time 
consuming — if rewarding — activity. Blogs that publish less than a post per week, or 
Twitter feeds that are not active almost every day, will likely lose followers, which probably 
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in part at least accounts for the rising number of collaborative blogging and social 
networking, as in the case of the highly visible Talking Philosophy blog and corresponding 
Twitter feed. This latter example also highlights the interconnectedness of virtual platforms: 
blog posts are publicized via tweets and/or Facebook and Google+ posts, and even the 
“brick-and-mortar” activities mentioned at the beginning of this section (philosophy cafes, 
magazines, etc.) benefit from being publicized via social networks. It is in this sense that 
public philosophy does in fact draw time and resources away from insular academic 
research. 
 
Consequently, a frequent reaction from colleagues who hear about the above-mentioned 
public pursuits is along the lines of, “why is anyone wasting her times doing this?,” or “that 
sort of thing cheapens real philosophy,” or finally, “those are just people who want to make 
money out of philosophy.” We find all three reactions downright bizarre, and more 
importantly, highly deleterious to the profession. 
 
Beginning with the third claim: it is not at all clear what exactly is wrong with professionals 
benefiting financially from public outreach efforts. The days during which philosophy was a 
pursuit open only to independently wealthy Athenians passed thousands of years ago, 
fortunately. Our colleagues draw regular salaries from their home universities, after all, and 
these salaries are in (often large) part justified by their teaching duties, and as we will see, 
there is no salient difference here. 
 
Concerning the alleged cheapening of real philosophy: it is certainly the case that public 
outreach — just like teaching — requires simplifications and a less rigorous (one would 
want to say more creative) approach than the one employed in the service of writing 
technical papers. But this is true of all disciplines (see our comments above about the 
effectiveness of science popularizing). Even so, a good number of magazine articles and 
book chapters put out in the service of public philosophy are rigorous, subtle, and inventive, 
as they are written by established professionals in the field. 
 
As for why we should bother: we find it shocking that any practicing philosopher would 
really need to be provided with an explicit answer, but see Section II for our take on it. 
 
All of this does raise an interesting question about public philosophy in general, and the 
forms discussed so far in particular: what is the relation of public philosophy to the subject’s 
general study, and can we draw any conclusions about public philosophy’s value from that 
relation? 
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IV. But is it philosophy? The continuum between teaching and philosophizing 
 
In order to determine whether or not public philosophy is a worthwhile pursuit for 
philosophers, it would help first to agree on what it is that philosophers do. This entails a 
definition of “philosophy,” which is a notoriously thorny issue (then again, so is the 
definition of science, though the problem doesn’t seem to bother scientists themselves too 
much). Nevertheless, when a journalist interested in the matter recently asked a wide range 
of professional philosophers to define the field, the responses varied significantly less than 
one might have imagined: almost all agreed that philosophy should be defined as a method 
or practice rather than as a particular subject matter or set of concepts.19 Most agreed that 
the method involves the exposure of ideas to critical evaluation. It is for similar reasons that 
John Dewey defined philosophy as a “general theory of education,” since the critical 
evaluation of any field’s ideas yields progress in that field.20 
 
We therefore define philosophy in broad and narrow senses. Broadly speaking, philosophy 
is any critical, rational reflection and discourse on conceptual connections. This is the sense 
classically propounded by Aristotle and more recently endorsed by such philosophers as 
Julian Baggini.21 In this broad sense, philosophy provides the bedrock upon which other 
fields of human endeavor are built, as is clear in the various “philosophies of” (e.g., science, 
mind, religion, art). This “applied” philosophy is derivative of more narrow philosophical 
discussion and may be pursued by philosophers and non-philosophers alike. In the narrow 
sense, philosophy is the activity performed normally, if not exclusively, by professional 
philosophers: critical reflection and discourse on specific, fundamental questions of human 
interest that cannot be resolved empirically. These topics are generally unclaimed by other 
disciplines and include issues in ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, and the like; even where 
these topics may be claimed by other disciplines, they remain conceptual and not resolved 
by practice within those disciplines. 
 
Distinguishing these broad and narrow senses of philosophy has important implications for 
public philosophy’s perceived and real value. Those colleagues who object to public 
philosophy because of its supposed irrelevance favor the narrow sense of philosophy: if a 
debate is not engaged solely by academic philosophers, or by other academics acting in the 
philosopher’s role, then it is outside the narrow purview of philosophy and consequently a 
distraction from “real” philosophy. But it is worth noting that the boundary between the 
broad and narrow senses of philosophy is vague. As we will show below, professional 
philosophers may productively engage questions outside the traditional philosophical core 
and non-philosophers may productively contribute to narrowly philosophical debates. It is 
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for these reasons that we assert that professional philosophers should value public 
philosophy. 
 
Consider the following taxonomy of philosophical activity. Professional philosophy 
includes a number of different kinds of social interaction, each (generally) with an expected 
level of philosophical discourse. We distinguish three primary forms of interaction (four 
forms overall) and three levels of discourse, related to one another in this manner: 
 
Form of Interaction Level of Discourse 
Professional Philosopher to Layperson Introductory 
Professional Philosopher to 
Philosophy Student 
Teacher to Undergraduate Student 
Intermediate 
Teacher to Graduate Student 
Advanced 
Professional Philosopher to Professional Academic 
 
 
The forms of interaction reflect the standard academic progression common to other 
disciplines as well (we could easily replace “professional philosopher” above with 
“professional scientist” or any other academic). Professionals in the discipline engage in 
introductory discourse with laypeople or lower-level undergraduates. As undergraduates 
continue in the discipline and learn greater sophistication in the subject, the level of 
discourse becomes intermediate: they understand the basics and begin to make headway 
into rougher disciplinary waters, but are still finding their proverbial sea legs. This 
intermediate level of discourse continues into graduate school until students complete their 
coursework, after which point they are expected to have achieved a subtle, nuanced 
understanding sufficient for making productive contributions to the discipline. This is 
(generally) the point at which discourse becomes advanced and students come to be 
considered as full colleagues. 
 
One important point to draw out of this taxonomy is that no clear line can be drawn between 
teaching philosophy and performing philosophy. Another important point is that no one 
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level of discourse correlates with any single form of interaction. These observations have 
implications for the value of public philosophy. 
 
If philosophy is, as Dewey suggested, a general theory of education, then it ought to be 
difficult to distinguish between performing philosophy and merely teaching it. Nevertheless, 
we might provisionally define teaching as the communication of a field’s ideas from a 
relative expert in that field to a relative novice. This communication proceeds in one 
direction: the novice gains additional understanding, but the expert does not. By this 
standard, the professional philosopher teaches laypeople and lower-level undergraduates. As 
undergraduates become more sophisticated, and as they enter graduate school, interactions 
between teacher and student are still largely skewed towards the benefit of one side (i.e., the 
student), but the students’ more sophisticated responses may expose the teacher’s ideas to 
critical evaluation. There are therefore aspects of actual performance of philosophy in these 
interactions and the interactions cannot neatly be classified as either teaching or 
performance of philosophy. Finally, interactions between professional philosophers and 
upper-level graduate students or other professional academics take place between peers: 
both parties can expect to profit from the interaction, and the exchange of ideas proceeds 
equally in both directions. This is clearly performance rather than teaching. The transition 
between teaching and performance of philosophy is therefore vague. 
 
This vagueness between philosophical teaching and performance should be expected from 
the lack of correlation between interaction type and level of discourse. By the expert’s 
lights, the level of discourse during teaching interactions is introductory. Advanced 
discourse, as with full colleagues and upper-level graduate students, requires performance 
rather than teaching. But intermediate discourse has characteristics in common with both 
other levels. Interactions between professional philosophers and upper-level undergraduates 
or lower-level graduate students are indisputably student-teacher interactions, but students 
at this point are expected to engage in some level of performance themselves. Somewhere in 
the transition from undergraduate education to graduate school, interactions gradually lose 
aspects of teaching and acquire aspects of philosophical performance; this vague transitional 
area is the level of intermediate discourse. 
 
Our proposed taxonomy has implications for the claim that public philosophy is a waste of 
the professional philosopher’s time. Take for granted the claim that advanced discourse is 
worth the professional’s time; after all, this is the level at which professional research is 
done. Professional philosophers interact with graduate students at an advanced level of 
discourse; advanced discourse bridges professional-professional and professional-student 
interactions. We may conclude that no one kind of interaction is the only one worth a 
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professional philosopher’s attention. If advanced discourse is the level at which a 
professional philosopher’s ideas are exposed to critical, rational evaluation, then we must 
also admit that intermediate discourse — which includes aspects of advanced discourse, as 
discussed above — is a worthwhile pursuit for the professional philosopher. The upshot is 
that professional philosophers ought to engage in multiple different sorts of interactions at 
multiple levels of discourse. One cannot fairly argue, then, that public philosophy is 
somehow below the professional philosopher’s concern simply because it is not an 
interaction between professional academics, or because it is not done at an advanced level 
of discourse. 
 
Of course, this raises the question of where in our taxonomy one should place public 
philosophy. The answer, we think, is both surprising and different from, say, what one 
would obtain in the sciences. If we were talking about physics, or biology, we would 
probably categorize interactions with the general public as those between professionals and 
laypeople, or perhaps between professionals and undergraduate students (at best). Most 
members of the public do not have anything like a graduate level understanding of science, 
and most importantly are in no position (valiant amateurish efforts notwithstanding) to 
actually participate in the advancement of science. Even so-called “citizen scientist” 
initiatives22 necessarily limit the contribution of non-professionals to data collection and 
perhaps a minimum of analysis, while the heavy duty conceptual work is done by 
professional scientists. 
 
The case of philosophy, we argue, is very different. Naturally, some laypeople will have a 
grasp of narrowly philosophical concepts that is less firm than that of an undergraduate 
student. But the practice of philosophy per se does not depend on expertise in any particular 
subject matter, as discussed above. In the broad sense, philosophy consists in the critical, 
rational evaluation of ideas; although their discipline-specific concerns define philosophy in 
the narrow sense, professional philosophers can and often do engage more broadly 
philosophical topics — especially when interacting with non-professionals. Since 
philosophy in the broad sense is dependent on philosophy in the narrow sense, broad 
philosophical discussions may cover narrowly philosophical ground, and so non-
professionals may likewise engage narrowly philosophical topics. Our experience with 
blogging, Meetups, social networking and the like has provided us with plenty of examples 
of non-professionals who are very well read even in some aspects of the narrow 
philosophical literature (depending on their interest), and who can argue points and further 
discussions almost on a par with professional philosophers. The charge that public 
philosophy is a distraction from narrowly philosophical concerns therefore fails because all 
philosophy has the potential to be public philosophy. 
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Similar considerations show that public philosophy is not less valuable to philosophers than 
other forms of philosophy. Narrowly philosophical interactions with members of the public 
include some aspects of teaching, but clearly take place at an intermediate level of discourse 
(at least). In those cases, therefore, doing public philosophy is performing actual philosophy 
(or close to it), and not merely teaching. If it is worth the professional philosopher’s time to 
teach graduate students — another form of interaction that includes aspects of teaching and 
performance — then surely it must also be worth the professional philosopher’s time to 
participate in public philosophy. 
 
We do not mean to imply that public philosophy would not be valuable to philosophers if it 
did not involve at least an intermediate level of discourse. To the contrary: we would 
consider public philosophy worth the effort even if it were exclusively a “mere” teaching 
interaction with the general public about philosophy, although of course that is a more 
difficult case to make to the skeptics. Academics often treat interactions at the introductory 
level of discourse as incidental at best. One “perk” of securing a tenure-track job is 
supposed to be a greater level of freedom from obligations to teach introductory-level 
courses; courses at that level of discourse are increasingly left to graduate-level adjunct 
instructors, few of whom are given formal training in teaching as part of their graduate 
education.23 24 Those who dismiss introductory-level teaching generally are not likely to 
value introductory-level public philosophy. 
 
This attitude has contributed to philosophy’s public relations problem. Recent research 
indicates that lower-level undergraduates are more likely to pursue higher-level study in 
humanities disciplines when their introductory-level courses are taught by tenured or tenure-
track faculty.25 Empirically, then, professional philosophers — who, as noted in section I, 
find their discipline under threat of extinction — would benefit from a less dismissive 
attitude towards introductory-level teaching: successful introductory-level discourse makes 
advanced-level discourse possible. Even if one does not adopt the view that introductory-
level teaching is valuable for its own sake (as we do), she must admit that it is valuable 
towards the security of higher-level discourse. As noted above: philosophy in the broad 
sense, which is more easily communicated to the layperson, depends on philosophy in the 
narrow sense. Professional philosophers do value teaching philosophy in the narrow sense 
to graduates and upper-level undergraduates. Since introductory instruction makes those 
more valued forms of teaching possible—by securing departmental resources, by recruiting 
new students, and by giving students tools for success at higher levels of discourse — it 
follows that professional philosophers ought to value teaching philosophy in the broad 
sense. Introductory-level interactions, including both undergraduate teaching and public 
philosophy, are therefore valuable to the professional philosopher. 
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Of course, some of the settings for public philosophy described in the previous section lend 
themselves better than others to the performance of philosophy. Accordingly, professional 
philosophers interested in having their narrowly philosophical ideas challenged from a fresh 
perspective would do well to concentrate on blogging, while philosophers more inclined to 
devote their time to public appreciation of philosophy, in both the broad and narrow senses, 
will be more efficacious by contributing to book chapters or hosting meetups and 
philosophy cafes. This brings us to the last question we would like to briefly discuss in this 
paper: if public philosophy is valuable for professional philosophers, then what should be 
done to further the idea of public philosophy among academic professionals? 
 
V. What should be done about public philosophy? 
 
We mentioned above that beginning in the 1990s a number of professional science 
societies have started to take much more seriously the idea of supporting and 
encouraging public outreach efforts by their members. The American Philosophical 
Association, however, is definitely behind the curve on this count. While the APA 
website lists resources for academics and graduate students, the focus is largely on 
professional philosophy or on teaching. 
 
Yet, even the APA has recently begun to pay attention. In 2011 it started a “Public 
Philosophy Op-Ed contest” sponsored by their committee on public philosophy. That year 
five entries were given the award (a not exactly impressive $100 each): James Stacey 
Taylor for “Want to Save Lives? Allow Bone Marrow Donors to be Paid” (Los Angeles 
Times), David Kyle Johnson for “Watson in Philosophical Jeopardy” (Psychology Today), 
José-Antonio Orosco for “Tuition Bill the Decent Option” (Corvallis Gazette-Times), 
Louise M. Antony for “Goodness Minus God” (New York Times), and Todd Edwin Jones 
for “Budgetary Hemlock” (Boston Review). Unfortunately, as of the time of this writing 
(late 2013) no additional competition has been announced, even though the web site states 
that the public philosophy prizes will be given annually. Clearly, much more can (and 
should, for the reasons given above) be done. 
 
There are a number of other steps that the APA and similar societies throughout the world 
(or even individual academic departments) could take in this respect. To begin with, a 
dedicated section of the web site could be devoted explicitly to public philosophy to send 
the message to their members that the issue is important. Perhaps the most important move 
would be to advice the academic community that public outreach ought to be considered as 
one of the criteria for granting tenure and/or promotion, alongside the traditional criteria of 
scholarship, teaching and university service. There is no reason why this additional criterion 
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cannot be quantified and standardized just like the other three are, although of course it 
would take some discussion and eventual consensus on the best ways to do it. It is our 
perception that the academic philosophical culture is changing anyway, with younger 
colleagues increasingly involved in blogging, writing for the public, and other outreach 
efforts. But it would certainly speed things up if professional societies and university 
administrations would send a clear message encouraging such activities, as opposed to just 
tolerating or even implicitly obstructing them. 
 
A perhaps more ambitious, but likely vital for the profession, effort could go into 
encouraging fundraising aimed at the establishment of professional chairs for the public 
understanding of philosophy, analogous to the Simonyi Professorship for Public 
Understanding of Science currently existing at Oxford University. One such chair actually 
exists, since 2009, at the University of Warwick (UK), and is currently held by Professor 
Angela Hobbs. This shows the feasibility of such endeavors, and we maintain that the 
community ought to strive so that this will soon become a much more common feature of 
the academic landscape. 
 
Certainly additional initiatives can be thought of and implemented in order to make public 
philosophy a standard component of what professional philosophers do, and this paper is 
meant only as a partial contribution to the ongoing conversation. We would like to remind 
our colleagues that public philosophy is not just good for the profession’s PR (which is 
badly needed anyway!), but is a way to bring public intellectualism back to the forefront of 
societal discussions concerning a broad range of issues on which philosophers can 
knowledgeably comment. Moreover, let us not forget that the academy as such largely 
exists because of the public purse (even private universities increasingly depend on public 
research grants to thrive), and that as the beneficiaries of such contribution it is a moral 
imperative for us to give something back to the public. 
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